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ORGANISED CRIME IN SCOTLAND
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE
Ben Cavanagh, Niall Hamilton-Smith and Simon Mackenzie
Introduction: the nature and extent of organised
crime in Scotland
Asking questions about organised crime is inherently problematic when even
diﬀerent experts, and oﬃcials in diﬀerent jurisdictions, cannot agree on what
organised crime actually is (Abadinsky 1981; Wright 2006). The Scottish deﬁnition
of ‘serious organised crime’ is contained within the Scottish Government strategy
document for tackling organised crime, Letting Our Communities Flourish (Serious
Organised Crime Taskforce, 2009). It requires the involvement of more than one
person; is organised, that is, it involves control, planning and the use of specialist
resources; causes or has the potential to cause signiﬁcant harm; and involves beneﬁt
to the individuals concerned, particularly ﬁnancial gain. In comparison, the UN
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime deﬁnes an organised criminal group
as a group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a
period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime
punishable by at least four years’ incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or
indirectly, a ﬁnancial or other material beneﬁt (United Nations, 2000). The United
Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) notes that since most groups of
any sort contain three or more people working in concert, and most exist for a
period of time, the true deﬁning characteristics of organised crime groups under
the Convention are their proﬁt-driven nature and the seriousness of the oﬀences
they commit (UNODC, 2014).
There are many other extant deﬁnitions of organised crime, and although there
tends to be some convergence around common themes, we can see even from the
Scottish and the UN deﬁnitions outlined here that there can be technical diﬀerences
in approach. However, consistent with UNODC, Scotland has sought to tighten
the focus of its eﬀorts by basing criminal justice responses and legislation on a
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deﬁnition of ‘serious organised crime’, where seriousness is deﬁned as involving an
indictable oﬀence which is undertaken to obtain some material beneﬁt, or where
an act or threat of violence is employed to obtain a future material beneﬁt
(Campbell, 2013). In this article we adopt the Serious Organised Crime Taskforce’s
use of ‘serious organised crime’ (SOC) as deﬁned in its 2009 strategy document,
without implying any disapproval of the use of alternative terms like ‘organised
crime’ (OC) or ‘transnational organised crime’ (TOC), both of which are often
used in this literature. Likewise, we will refer to Organised Crime Groups (OCGs),
although again this does not denote a dispute with current trends in the literature,
to consider the networked and more ﬂuid aspects of contemporary SOC. We
accept that the term Organised Crime Networks is equally valid (see von Lampe,
2004, for a comprehensive discussion).
Even though the deﬁnitions of organised crime that are used across places and
institutions generally include many of the same concepts, the absence of universally
agreed deﬁnitions makes it very diﬃcult to engage in a comparative account of, or
evidence, the nature and extent of SOC in Scotland.
Another contextual caveat is important to note: that is, a considerable amount of
data and analysis on SOC in Scotland comes from police work. There have been
few independent empirical or ethnographic studies of Scottish SOC, so police
observation and analytical work forms a signiﬁcant proportion of the data on which
academic analysis can proceed. This comes with well-known methodological
issues. The oﬃcial gathering of data on any phenomenon may run closer than we
might hope to a process of ‘construction’ of that phenomenon (for example,
Cicourel, 1968). In relation to SOC, perhaps the most signiﬁcant problem is the
circular or self-reinforcing eﬀect of the focus of police resources on investigating
and seeking to control certain known types of oﬀences or persons. This can lead,
over time, through a deepening of oﬃcial knowledge of those oﬀences, persons or
their associates, to an investigation agenda which is not fully open to the alternative
possibilities of less well-known organised crimes or criminals (Sheptycki, 2007).
For instance, until recently, UK SOC policing priorities focused largely on well-
established criminal activities, such as drug traﬃcking, whilst increased opportunities
for SOC actors to exploit new environmental regulations and incentive schemes
were eﬀectively excluded on the basis that ‘environmental crime’ was not a
recognised crime category on which intelligence was commissioned or collected
(Hamilton-Smith and Mackenzie, 2010).
The self-perpetuating circularity in SOC intelligence gathering and priority setting
is an important issue for our understanding of organised crime threats, and certainly not
one that is peculiar to Scottish policing and policy approaches. Indeed, many police
forces are alert to this problem. In Scotland, the use of active (rather than passive)
approaches such as horizon scanning and scenario-based threat assessment which
deliberately aim to ‘think outside the box’ and introduce new lines of analysis
based on ‘what if’ type questions attempt to deal with this. These are particularly
salient currently around rapid developments in technology, such as advancements
in 3D printing and possible future utilisations of biometric technology, which as
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well as bringing social advances may oﬀer up foreseeable or in some cases unpredictable
opportunities for organised crime.
The extent of SOC can be thought of in a number of diﬀerent ways, including,
for example, issues of organisational size, numbers of ‘nominals’ (that is, individuals
known to be involved in SOC), ﬁnancial estimates of illicit market size or the
amount of harm caused by the criminal activities involved. Even the concept of
harm can be further broken down and contested: are we talking about social,
political, economic harm, for example, and how do we conceive of victimisation in
relation to each of these? This chapter will attempt to describe what is available by
way of ‘measuring’ SOC in Scotland in terms of economic and other costs; the
characteristics of SOC nominals; and ﬁnally in terms of the characteristics and
activities of OCGs. We will then consider recent developments in terms of criminal
justice strategies and responses.
The costs (and harms) of serious organised crime
There are oﬃcial estimates of the overall cost of certain types of harm caused by
SOC in Scotland, but no comprehensive academic studies of the range and scale
of SOC markets. In 2009, Audit Scotland published an estimate of the ﬁnancial
harm SOC causes to the Scottish economy at £2bn per annum (Audit Scotland,
2009). Also, in 2009 Casey et al. proposed a higher ﬁgure, not in respect of SOC
harms generally conceived, but in respect of the harms associated with illicit drug
use: ‘The total economic and social cost of illicit drug use in Scotland is estimated
at just under £3.5bn. Costs associated with problem drug use accounts for 96% of
the total and this equates to just under £61,000 per problem drug user. Recrea-
tional drug use accounts for 4% of the total estimated cost (Casey et al., 2009). As
reﬂected in the reference not only to the ‘economic’ costs but the ‘social’ costs of
illicit drug use, we can observe that SOC causes a range of harms beyond ﬁnancial
loss, and identifying these harms and determining how to measure them has
become a key concern for police in recent years. Harms are increasingly recognised
to include not only the direct and immediate impacts on victims (ﬁnancial loss,
physical injury and so on), but also the subtler and more systemic ways in which
organised crime can inﬂict damage on Scotland. This would bring into considera-
tion things like reputational damage to the legitimacy of the criminal justice infra-
structure; fear of crime in aﬀected communities; providing negative role models to
marginalised young people; and maintaining and deepening the stigma and social
exclusion associated with certain disadvantaged communities (Hamilton-Smith and
Mackenzie, 2010; Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; see also Chapter 4).
As well as the short- and medium-term eﬀects of victimisation from individual
serious organised crimes, there is evidence of longer-term and concentrated harms
from SOC in certain locations, and for certain social groups. Home Oﬃce research
in 2009 and 2011 found greater risk of SOC harms in more deprived locations.
A national survey of public perceptions of organised crime in Scotland in 2013
(Ipsos Mori/Scottish Government), found that people living in Scotland associate
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the harms of SOC as disproportionately aﬀecting younger people, older people and
those on low income/from deprived backgrounds. This impact was perceived
more strongly than impacts on businesses or the economy. The Joseph Rowntree
foundation also found evidence (Green and Owen, 2006) of people in poorer areas
using illicit markets and goods to get by, in the absence of mainstream goods and
services. This disproportionate risk of harm from SOC may therefore be consistent
with ﬁndings from other sources, for example, the Scottish Crime and Justice
Survey, that show a greater risk of victimisation for people who live in the most
deprived parts of Scotland (Scottish Government, 2014).
Who is involved in serious organised crime groups?
One of the most comprehensive sources of information about organised crime in
Scotland since 2009 is the work done by the police to systematically collate intelli-
gence on SOC on Scotland, known as ‘Serious Organised Crime Group Mapping’.
This ‘map’ (produced via a methodology we explain in more detail below) is routinely
updated, and shows that geographically the spread of reported OCG activity in
Scotland is primarily focused on the central belt, and in particular Glasgow and the
west of Scotland (the region of Scotland with the most acute social deprivation and
with long-standing problems with drug addiction and youth gangs, all arguably
common ‘pre-cursor’ ingredients for nurturing SOC). Nevertheless, all areas of the
country are aﬀected to some extent. Recent, reported mapping data recorded 227
OCGs in Scotland and about 3,400 OCG ‘nominals’ (Scottish Police Authority,
2013). These ﬁgures relate to OCGs identiﬁed by Police Scotland. However,
partner agencies can also identify and nominate OCGs for inclusion, and although
recent ﬁgures for these additions are not publicly available, in 2009 the combined
total of police and other agency identiﬁed groups was 367 organised crime groups
and 4,066 nominals (Scottish Serious Organised Crime Group Mapping Project,
2009: 1). Whilst the map is still somewhat impressionistic in its coverage of the
varieties of harm associated with OCGs, it does provide a reasonably useful overview
of the characteristics of those involved in OCGs and the sort of activities being
undertaken.
Mapping data suggest that organised criminals in Scotland tend to have a diﬀerent
age-crime curve than other types of ‘street’ (as opposed to white-collar) oﬀender.
This is consistent with evidence from other jurisdictions (Kleemans and de Poot,
2008; Francis et al., 2013). Mapped nominals are predominantly men aged 25–35,
although there has also been a growth in the number of identiﬁed under-18s since
the ﬁrst mapping exercise in 2009. According to analysts working with the mapping
data, young nominals are often engaged in something akin to apprenticeships.
Young oﬀenders may start with involvement in shop theft and scrap metal theft,
potentially then progressing into stealing plant machinery before ﬁnally ‘graduating’
into drug dealing.
In terms of the gender balance in SOC in Scotland, trends in the involvement of
female oﬀenders remain less clear. The proportion of female nominals in OCGs has
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remained broadly similar from year to year at around 12 per cent of all mapped
nominals. However, only 25 per cent of these are designated by the police as actual
members of OCGs, with the remainder being considered ‘associates’. This is fairly
consistent with international literature that sees SOC as heavily male-centric and
which tends to talk about women mainly as victims, or as exploited participants,
rather than fully involved members of an OCG. For instance, women often appear
in the literature as individuals who are used to smuggle illicit commodities (see for
example Huling, 1995) or carry ﬁrearms (Molidor, 1996), on the basis that the
social construction of notions of gender and vulnerability portray them as easier to
coerce, whilst they are simultaneously less likely to generate oﬃcial suspicion.
Gender-based inﬂuences have also been proposed to enable women involved in
SOC to win the trust of potential victims with, for instance, previously traﬃcked
women becoming complicit in the recruitment or handling of new victims (see
Turner and Kelly, 2009). Home Oﬃce ﬁgures published for England and Wales
show women comprising between 2 to 8 per cent of nominals depending on the
crime category (Francis et. al., 2013). However, unlike the Scottish estimates, these
ﬁgures are based on convictions as opposed to intelligence. International research
has suggested that women may be less likely than men to be convicted of a SOC
oﬀence, in part because women may undertake more discrete and administrative
roles (Beare, 2010) or because the onset of their involvement may be compara-
tively late compared to a more conventional criminal career or when compared to
their male SOC compatriots (Vere van Koppen et al., 2010).
There is no available robust evidence as to the level of involvement of foreign
nationals or ethnic minority citizens in SOC. Even broad indicators such as the pro-
portion of foreign nationals in Scottish prisons are not publicly available, although
Scottish Government ﬁgures on ethnicity suggest a very modest disproportionality
in imprisonment across all oﬀence types, with minority groups comprising 3.9 per cent
of the prison population in 2011–12, whilst constituting 3.2 per cent of the general
Scottish population (Communities Analytical Services, 2013: 41). In 2009 it was
estimated that just over 9 per cent of identiﬁed SOC nominals in Scotland were of
non-white European background (Scottish Serious Organised Crime Group Mapping
Project, 2009: 4). This contrasts with England and Wales where, in 2013, ethnic
minorities constituted some 21 per cent of British nationals in prison (House of
Commons Library, 2013: 10), with 13.2 per cent of prisoners being categorised as
‘black or black British’ in spite of only constituting 2.8 per cent of the general
population (House of Commons Library, 2013: 11). In terms of non-indigenous
SOC nominals, in-house analysis by Scottish police analysts (Police Scotland, 2014)
has found, like published ﬁndings in England and Wales (Hamilton-Smith and
Patel, 2010), no compelling evidence of any distinct patterns of criminality, or any
‘imported’ styles of organised criminality, beyond fairly predictable associations
between being foreign and being engaged in some of the transnational aspects of
organised crime, and/or being involved in the evasion of border controls. More-
over, in contrast to England and Wales, the number of non-indigenous criminals
involved in serious organised crime is considered still to be low (Police Scotland,
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2014) with a rough estimate of less than 5 per cent of SOC nominal in 2009 being
identiﬁed as foreign nationals (Scottish Serious Organised Crime Group Mapping
Project, 2009: 4). Indeed, the most notable and well-documented foreign SOC
presence in Scotland, an oﬀshoot of the Italian Camorra in Aberdeen, has been
observed to involve no obvious predatory criminality within the Scottish jurisdic-
tion but rather is thought to centre on the running of legitimate businesses for
money-laundering purposes (Campana, 2011).
Serious organised crime: the activities of OCGs
In prefacing a discussion of SOC activities, we should ﬁrst acknowledge an
important underlying tension in organised crime analysis between on one hand the
activities of OCGs and, on the other, their capacities or structure. There has been
debate in the literature, and in policy and practice circles, about the relative weight
that should be given, in assessing the threat posed by any given OCG, to its
structure and membership versus its known activities (Levi, 2014; Hamilton-Smith
and Mackenzie, 2010). Some analysts hold that the actual crimes that members of a
group are known to have committed are both the best predictor of future crimin-
ality by members of the group and the most salient measure of the harm caused,
and likely to be caused, by the group. Against this, other analysts argue that a
deﬁning feature of OCGs is their latent capacity for harm; in other words, that
there is a sinister and potentially dangerous aspect to the associations between the
criminals which should be considered alongside our knowledge of the harms they
have actually so far caused. This debate reﬂects the conceptual roots of thinking
about organised crime as much as it informs contemporary policy responses, and it
can be seen to aﬀect many aspects of policing engagement. For example, organised
crime group mapping, mentioned in this chapter as a centrepiece of Scotland’s
policing response to SOC, includes a threat matrix which ranks all known OCGs
in the country by way of a scoring system that is informed by both the known
prior activities of the group and an assessment of the dangerous capacities which
the structure of the associations within the group may hold. This mixed activity-
capacity approach is now quite common, and a similar scheme is used in England
and Wales. Some other jurisdictions adopt diﬀerent approaches, sometimes, for
example, considering only ‘activities’ but with no inclusion of ‘capacity’ or ‘structure’
entering into the equation.
OC mapping data is constructed from existing police intelligence and may not
provide a comprehensive account of the full range of SOC in Scotland, but it
provides the best approximation currently available of the range of activities they
might be involved in. Over recent data sweeps, the approximate proportion of
OCGs (note this is groups, not nominals) involved in speciﬁc types of SOC activity
have been reported as:
 76.3% involved in drug oﬀences;
 33.1% have access to ﬁrearms;
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 26.1% involved in violence;
 17.1% involved in money laundering;
 9.3% involved in drug importation;
 9.0% involved in immigration crime;
 8.8% involved in fraud;
 0.8% involved in human traﬃcking (Scottish Police Authority, 2013: 3).
In spite of the change in numbers of groups, key patterns remain fairly static across
mapping sweeps. Primarily, the importation, distribution and supply of drugs remains
overwhelmingly the interrelated set of criminal concerns that drives organised
crime policing in Scotland. Several research projects based at Glasgow University
have built an evidence base in respect of drug misuse in Scotland: these include
estimates of the size and value of the illicit drug market in Scotland, and its social
and economic cost (Hay et al., 2009; Casey et al., 2009). Though the heroin epidemic
of the 1980s and 1990s may have waned, the social and criminal consequences of
that period continue to be felt: many of the ‘users’ of that period suﬀer from high
rates of premature mortality (National Records of Scotland, 2012). OCGs have
laundered and reinvested their proﬁts obtained from the distribution and sale of
heroin and have diversiﬁed their activities, often into dealing or distributing other
more recreational drugs. Drugs also appear as the main type of SOC problem felt
by communities in Scotland, as reported in the Scottish Household Survey. From
2005–13 there has been a stable annual trend of 11–13 per cent of people
who have said that drug dealing/misuse is common in their local area (Scottish
Government, 2014).
Many of the other SOC issues currently of concern to the police reﬂect the
collateral aspects of drug oﬀending (such as violence and ﬁrearms) and supporting
infrastructure (e.g. the employment of specialist ‘facilitators’ such as lawyers and
accountants, as well as the use of foreign nationals for cannabis cultivation which
can involve attendant crimes involving the traﬃcking of those people). SOC
activities can also represent complementary by-products of drug traﬃcking such as
laundering the proﬁts. Indeed, much of the more innovative work of the Scottish
Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA) in Scotland had been on targeting
the ‘front businesses’ through which money is laundered or proﬁts are ‘invested’
(Murray, 2010a). At the time of writing, this focus on identifying illicit money
ﬂows is being developed further by Police Scotland as a project in its own right,
code-named ‘Jackal’.
The re-investment of drugs proﬁts, often laundered via foreign banking systems,
notably Spain (Steinko, 2012), has led to novel patterns of investment (Murray,
2012). Aside from more conventional front businesses such as catering, taxi ﬁrms
and security ﬁrms, Scottish OCGs have reportedly invested in retirement homes,
childcare businesses and nurseries and more recently (and somewhat poetically) in
funeral businesses. Businesses involving cash in hand such as taxi ﬁrms, or where
the competitiveness of the market makes the low start-up costs associated with
SOC ‘investment’ particularly attractive (such as childcare and retirement homes),
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seem to be factors that drive the ﬂow of money (Murray, 2010b). Another growth
area has been waste management and recycling, and this is thought to relate to
criminal opportunities consequent on the high costs of properly-regulated waste
disposal, which allow those prepared to ﬂout the regulations to undercut legitimate
disposal companies.
The extent to which organised criminals are predatory on legitimate economic
sectors and structures is most vividly illustrated, in Scotland, in oﬃcial concerns
regarding inﬁltration of public sector contract work by OCGs. This, again, is a
by-product of OCG diversiﬁcation into legitimate business concerns, laundering
money through company ‘fronts’. Public sector contracts are valued at approxi-
mately £9 billion annually in Scotland and are awarded through a procurement
process which involves a central procuring authority inviting bids from competitive
tenderers. These contracts include suppliers of all products and services to the
public sector. The risk of SOC groups becoming involved in public procurement
has become a matter receiving international attention, and work has been done in
the EU to protect procurement processes from SOC inﬁltration (Caneppele et al.,
2009; White, 2000; Curtol et al., 2007; Dorn et al., 2008). The increasing com-
plexity of contracting and supplier chains, a focus on contract cost over a more
balanced set of quality criteria and a general tendency to outsource and privatise
large tracts of public sector services combine to provide a rich opportunity envir-
onment for OCGs. The challenge within Scotland has been to devise ways of
prooﬁng procurement processes so that OCGs can be deterred or weeded out,
whilst simultaneously avoiding falling foul of domestic and EU procurement and
competition policies, and a Scottish Government priority to make public sector
contracts more accessible for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Beyond drugs, and the diversiﬁcation of OCG proﬁts, a key preoccupation for
the police recently has been human traﬃcking. The nature of this crime has brought
an increased focus within the police on developing new forms of partnership working
to address it. Though the limited evidence regarding its prevalence would suggest it
represents a relatively modest threat (Lebov, 2009), certainly when compared to
drug distribution, manufacturing and importation the very uncertainty engendered
by a lack of available evidence, coupled with historically poor criminal justice and
specialist support service provision, has led to a prioritisation by both government
and the police. Research has been commissioned to examine the care and support
needs of victims of human traﬃcking in Scotland (Malloch et al., 2012) and the
speciﬁc nature and extent of Scotland’s role as a market for child traﬃcking (Cody
et al., 2011).
The criminal justice response to organised crime in Scotland
Structurally, there has been a radical change in the arrangements for dealing with
SOC in Scotland since devolution in 1999, encapsulated in the attempt at policy
level to move away from response and reaction towards prevention and partnership.
This has not always been easy to achieve in the face of a somewhat entrenched
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predisposition in policing towards traditional responsive criminal justice approaches.
Before devolution, Scotland had the same policy direction and activities for tackling
organised crime as England and Wales. In the 1980s, the Home Oﬃce focused on
drugs crime through regional crime squads and the National Drugs Intelligence
Unit (NDIU). The Scottish Crime Squad was a Scottish application of this
approach, focusing on cross-border crime without being speciﬁcally drugs focused.
The crime squads and NDIU evolved into NCIS in the early 1990s. The National
Criminal Intelligence Service operated throughout the UK but the National Crime
Squad (which operated in England and Wales only) had a drugs focus but also
concerned itself with other types of crime.
The Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency (SDEA) was formed in 2003 as a
national agency that, as the name suggests, mainly focused on drugs. A few years later,
to signify a broadening of the remit into other types of organised crime besides
drug traﬃcking, the SDEA became the SCDEA (Scottish Crime and Drug Enforce-
ment Agency). SCDEA was established by statute, in 2006, as a national police agency
to deal with SOC, with its leadership at deputy chief constable level as a director
general with responsibility for direction and control, and with operational auton-
omy from the eight Scottish regional forces. It also brought a new emphasis on
crime that crossed force borders and required technical and specialist resources
which a single force could not justify (for example, relating to surveillance).
In time these organisational developments would allow the deployment of some
innovative tactics, though up to the late 2000s Scotland, in keeping with the rest of
the UK (which in turn was inﬂuenced by the US), focused its organised crime
eﬀorts on conventional law enforcement and detection tactics. This approach was
predicated on now outdated notions of organised crime being characterised by
hierarchical groups, with leaders, or ‘kingpins’. It was supposed that if the police
arrested the kingpins, these groups would cease to function eﬀectively without
their leaders. The approach has now been largely discredited (Pearson and Hobbs,
2003). SOC enterprises are increasingly now thought not to take hierarchical forms
always; rather they are ﬂuid, taking the form of networks that have a capacity to
adapt quickly to evolving criminal opportunities and law enforcement threats in a
way ‘traditional’, ‘hierarchical’ or ‘structure-controlled’ OCGs might not have (Lo,
2010; Morselli, 2009; Levi and Maguire, 2004). Kingpins were often easily
replaceable, and even if they were not, prison may fail to prevent these individuals
from continuing to direct their criminal enterprises from behind bars. Most dama-
gingly for Scotland, and indeed similar jurisdictions where the organised crime threat
was heavily dominated by the importation and distribution of illegal narcotics, the
incentives and rewards for dealing in drugs were so great (see, for example, Pearson
and Hobbs, 2001) that the incapacitation of one key individual was likely to lead to
fairly immediate and successful adaptations by users and other drug market players,
to reconﬁgure drug sales to make them less vulnerable to law enforcement activity
(Bouchard, 2007).
Nevertheless, the policing of organised crime under the SDEA, and then the
SCDEA in its early years, continued in the vein of pursuing the ‘Mister Bigs’ of
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gangland Glasgow in particular. Indeed, the reportage published by journalists and
ex-police oﬃcers from this period amply testiﬁes to the glamorisation of the pursuit
of these underworld ‘crime lords’ (for example, Pearson, 2008).
The approach towards dealing with SOC in Scotland began to change in the
late 2000s; from being perceived and dealt with by policing, as part of a general
response towards detection and enforcement of crime, towards reﬂecting a better
understanding of it as something distinct, with its own causes and impacts, requir-
ing in turn bespoke and more holistic strategies centred on prevention as well as
enforcement. Notably, in 2007, the Scottish Government established a policy unit
on SOC and set up a ‘taskforce’ partnership to work on the issue.
The development of the remit of SCDEA also mirrored this evolution in the
understanding of SOC, moving from a narrower drug and enforcement remit to
take on a much wider range of OCG activities and deploying a more extensive
suite of tactics. Key features of SCDEA included the Scottish Intelligence Coordi-
nation Unit (SICU), established in 2010, which became the home for innovations
in mapping and risk assessing organised crime threats, and the Interventions Unit,
which developed partnerships (with both public and private partners) focused on
educational and preventative initiatives.
These attempts at a more prevention-oriented approach to engaging with
SOC are incorporated in the Scottish Government’s Letting Our Communities
Flourish (2009) strategy, which distributes responsibility and resources for dealing
with SOC from police to other organisations, including private sector business
organisations, housing associations and local authorities, whose work contains
opportunities to deal with the business operations of organised crime. The strategy
focuses on the impact of organised crime on the social and economic well-being of
communities and describes an approach which reﬂects the changed conceptualisation
of organised crime as a matter of enforcement and criminal sanction towards
something that requires more complex responses. These responses are categorised
under four headings: ‘divert’, ‘detect’, ‘deter’ and ‘disrupt’ (Serious Organised
Crime Taskforce, 2009).
The ‘divert’ theme involves prevention and diversionary work with people who
might be at risk of becoming more involved in criminal markets, either as the sellers or
consumers of illicit goods. This includes educational work in schools and information
and communications campaigns with members of the public to provide more infor-
mation about the nature of organised crime markets and their risks. It also entails
work targeted towards the people who may be at risk of becoming organised
criminals through family links.
‘Detect’ includes more traditional intelligence gathering as well as improving crim-
inal intelligence systems, risk and threat assessment, OCG mapping and improving the
social science evidence base so that there is greater awareness of the nature of the
problem generally. This also includes the development of ﬁnancial intelligence as a
more central aspect of police investigations, following money through national and
international banks, and improving the abilities of recognising and investigating
suspicious activity in ﬁnancial institutions.
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Activities under the ‘disrupt’ heading are based on the idea that the power and
continuity of organised crime groups come from their assets and ﬁnances and this
work aims to remove the ﬁnancial gains that have been made through illicit
activity, and also to weaken the ﬁnancial base of criminal organisations by using the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to seize the assets of organised criminals so that illicit
businesses are less sustainable.
The ‘deter’ strand of the strategy includes activities to protect businesses, commu-
nities and victims through enhanced collaboration between the public and private
sectors to raise the awareness of threats, including the situational elements of organised
criminal attacks such as loopholes in licensing and public procurement regulations.
The Scottish organised crime strategy also connects with work on organised crime
in Europe and supports an ‘administrative’ rather than just a traditional criminal
justice approach. Examples of this include a taskforce subgroup set up to consider
the problem mentioned above of public sector procurement and the risks of organised
crime groups being awarded contracts for goods and services, and a communications
subgroup promoting public and community understanding of SOC to enable
communities to protect themselves. The key driver and facilitator of these strategic
and policing developments in Scotland has been the Serious Organised Crime
Group Mapping referred to earlier. This has systematised police data on SOC in
Scotland and developed in a unique collaboration between academics, government
researchers, police oﬃcers and analysts to produce a unique information system for
collecting, collating, interrogating and weighting information on organised crime
nominals and groups. Its objectives are to:
 Provide better, more systematically collated and joined up intelligence to allow
for a more accurate and complete assessment of organised crime in Scotland.
This would have spin-oﬀ beneﬁts in terms of identifying links between nom-
inals and groups that were previously unknown, and in terms of identifying
supporting aspects of OCGs (such as front businesses and specialists) that would
respond best to more innovative and collaborative, multi-agency responses.
 Provide better evidence with which to prioritise police activity. The intention
was to move away from prioritising law enforcement activity on the basis of a
criminal’s ‘reputation’ or on the basis of non-systematic judgements about whether
one type of organised criminality was more serious than another. The mapping
process is about making a more balanced and objective assessment of both the
capability of organised crime groups and networks and the harm associated with
their activities.
 Allow for emerging trends to be identiﬁed and for policing and partner per-
formance to be assessed over time, therefore moving away from existing and
simpliﬁed performance indicators that relied on distorting metrics such as ‘number
of nominals arrested’ (even if the arrest of a batch of low-level nominals made a
negligible diﬀerence to the capability of OCGs) or ‘assets recovered’ (which again
may not be strategically related to recovering the assets that are going to have the
most impact in terms of incapacitating or de-incentivising prominent OCGs).
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The products that underpin the mapping are:
 A ‘tracker’ to collate and structure intelligence on OCGs and nominals on an
ongoing basis, with periodic sweeps being submitted by police analysts across
Scotland.
 A ‘matrix’, which is the scoring tool through which tracker information
on OCGs is processed centrally, to render scores which guide subsequent
prioritisation (that is, which groups are presenting the greatest threat).
 The ‘activity worksheet’, which drives tasking. This is essentially an analytical
product that takes the matrix scoring and then asks the question, ‘What are we
doing about it’? The process asks questions such as what policing resources and
assets were being used, what international assets and what multi-agency assets
were being used to tackle a particular OCG.
The mapping exercise has been a major feature, and transformative mechanism,
in the Scottish policing response to organised crime in recent years. It has been
vital in incentivising law enforcement to consider and target the systemic aspects of
the drug trade, and whilst continuing to focus on illicit drugs as the dominant
concern, to also consider and target other types of organised crime. The evidence
would suggest that a key value in doing so is that OCGs themselves fear little from
law enforcement action in terms of apprehension and imprisonment, but do gen-
uinely fear actions that may result in the conﬁscation of their assets (Matrix
Knowledge Group, 2007). However, an equally strong motive has been on the
more general deterrence aspect of weakening the inﬂuence of OCG role models, a
number of whom, within the Scottish jurisdiction, have successfully disengaged
from organised criminality and reinvented themselves as wealthy, ‘legitimate’ business
leaders. Such individuals are prominent in a number of deprived Scottish commu-
nities and have a troubling potential inﬂuence, as the origins of their wealth and
inﬂuence are well known (Hamilton-Smith and Mackenzie, 2011).
The future of organised crime and its control in Scotland
There are a number of developments that may have an impact on the way organised
crime is understood and tackled in Scotland in the future. Some of these are
changes that are currently underway, while others are necessarily more speculative.
In April 2013, a major change occurred in the way policing is structured and
delivered in Scotland (see Chapter 11). The country’s eight regional police forces were
amalgamated into one national force, called Police Scotland, and in the process
SCDEA was incorporated into the new force structure. SCDEA’s functions were
rolled into a new specialist crime division as part of a process of centralisation
which also saw the creation of a new ‘crime campus’, a national base for tackling
organised crime and terrorism located at Gartcosh in North Lanarkshire. The
transition to Police Scotland has inevitably led to some disruption and uncertainty
in OC policing and the longer-term implications of this centralisation are unclear.
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However, the crime campus development would seem to be more unambiguously
promising. The idea is modelled on a Scottish version of multi-agency co-location
inscribed in the FBI campus approach in the USA. As such, it can be seen as one of
the many examples of ‘policy transfer’ (Jones and Newburn, 2007), which in
Scottish policing has tended to involve looking both east and west, to the USA on
the one hand and continental Europe on the other.
The European component has been part of a wider Scottish policy and political
interest in progressive countries in north west Europe, considered as comparators to
the Scottish case: in particular, Norway, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands
(Fyfe, 2014; Terpstra and Fyfe, 2014). If the crime campus idea came from the
USA, just as the SDEA was in its inception inﬂuenced by positive perceptions
within Scotland’s police and policy communities of a US-style drug enforcement
agency approach, Scotland’s approach to some other attempts to regulate SOC are
distinctly European in ﬂavour. One example of the European inﬂuence can be
found in the case of the control of procurement fraud (see above). The procure-
ment subgroup has undertaken ﬁeld trips to the Netherlands to learn about the
laws and practices relating to SOC inﬁltration into public procurement processes
through the creation and use of ‘front companies’ as vehicles for OCGs to access
public funds through purportedly legitimate service contracts.
The crime campus approach, symbolising a fresh acceptance of the values and
beneﬁts of multi-agency partnership working, promises to overcome many of the
traditional organisational and cultural barriers that have, historically, hindered
organised crime policing. That said, the operational reach of organised criminals
still stretches across borders to the wider UK, and to Europe and the world
beyond. In particular, gaps in eﬀectiveness may still be particularly prone to arise if
the Specialist Crime Division does not have eﬀective collaborative arrangements for
sharing intelligence, and for undertaking joint operational activity, with the
Regional Organised Crime Units in England and Wales, and with the new
National Crime Agency (NCA). However, the presence of the NCA at Gartcosh,
and the public commitment of the new body to work more collaboratively with
law enforcement partners (HM Government, 2013), and thereby not to repeat the
perceived mistakes of its predecessor body (SOCA), may be seen as promising.
In terms of the future of evidence production through research, it seems fair to
say that although there are systems being put in place which aim to improve the
operational delivery of SOC policing, the social science research evidence base on
the scale and nature of SOC remains relatively underdeveloped nationally and
internationally compared to what we know about other types of crime. There is at
present a distinct lack of information about the diﬀerential impact of organised
crime markets on various sections of society. Key emerging concerns are with the
identiﬁcation, understanding and measurement of the types of ‘harm’ organised
crime causes on a community level, and working towards a suitable metric for
harm involves considering organised crime’s impact on the physical and social well-
being of communities, on processes of democracy (for example, corruption of
government oﬃcials) and on life chances of people who live in locations where
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there are active illicit markets. These impacts may also, of course, be conceived of
as ‘beneﬁts’ in communities where weak social capital and sustained economic
marginalisation may make the presence of OCGs and illicit markets (with cheap
illicit goods, reinvested criminal proﬁts, alternative ‘social order’ and often gla-
morised criminal role models) attractive to local residents. Research elsewhere in
the UK (notably Hobbs, 2002; Tilley and Hopkins, 2008) has begun to explore
how OCGs, even when global in reach, can nevertheless be deeply rooted and
integrated into local communities and local legitimate economies. Given the
intractable, concentrated and geographically stable nature of social exclusion, pov-
erty and criminality in Scotland (see Houchin, 2005), a better evidenced under-
standing of the impact of OCGs in key communities, and more robust evaluations
of current legislative and criminal justice interventions to mitigate these impacts
would seem long overdue.
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